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READING KANT FROM A CATHOLIC HORIZON: 
ETHICS AND THE ANTHROPOLOGY OF GRACE 
PHILIP l . ROSSI , S.l. 
For two centuries Catholic philosophers and theologians have gen-
erally treated Immanuel Kant's critical philosophy as incompatible 
with principLes fundamental to Catholic accounts of the human 
condition in relation to God. This article argues that contemporary 
schoLarship-particularly about the role of anthropological con-
cerns in the critical project-indicates that Kant's understanding of 
finite human freedom provides a basis for Catholic theology to 
engage his thinking positively in the articulation of a theology of 
grace for humanity's postmodern context. 
T HIS ARTICLE ARGUES FOR a renewed Catholic theological engagement with the critical philosophy of Immanuel Kant (1724-1804) . It 
advances this argument within the context of a larger thesis about the 
theological presuppositions that function within Kant 's work, as well as 
within interpretations both friend and foe of his philosophy have given to 
his project of "critique." This thesis is that key differences in the ways both 
philosophers and theologians have understood central elements of the 
critical philosophy frequently exhibit divergent "theological horizons" 
against which these interpreters have explicitly or, more often, implicitly 
framed their rendering of the issues, arguments, and concepts in Kant's 
texts . Such theological horizons function, in the first instance, on Kant's 
own part, inasmuch as the critical philosophy articulates its account of 
human finitude over against a robust sense of transcendence. For Kant, 
fundamental to the conceptual space of the human-i.e. , to the articulation 
of an account of what distinctively constitutes our humanity-is the orien-
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tation of that space to transcendence as it delimits the contours of our 
properly human finitude. In affirming human finitude-for which his trope 
is "the limits of reason"-as marked out by radical difference from tran-
scendence, Kant stands within the theological horizon to which the reflec-
tive traditions of Abrahamic monotheism have oriented themselves in 
affirming "God" as the proper name for the transcendence humanity 
encounters in radical Otherness. 
Yet theological horizons also operate from the side of Kant's readers; 
within many of these horizons, however, Kant's way of locating the con-
ceptual space of the human by its orientation to transcendence can no 
longer be taken as given. Kant himself may very well have framed his 
account of the human by reference to transcendence that we unavoidably 
must think, even as he contended that it exceeds our capacity to think 
transcendence "as" an "object," i.e., to articulate it cognitively. Whatever 
he may have held negatively about the possibility of humans rendering 
transcendence cognitively intelligible, a human orientation to transcen-
dence still remains fundamental to his theological horizon. His readers, 
however, particularly in the unfolding course of late modernity and its 
aftermath, have increasingly found themselves within various forms of 
what Charles Taylor has termed an "immanent frame. ,,1 
Here the theological horizon has shifted from what it was for Kant, so 
that the conceptual space of the human no longer seems to require, as 
condition for its intelligibility, an orientation to transcendence. So even 
as some readers continue to frame their understanding of the critical phi-
losophy against a theological horizon akin to Kant's, in which transcen-
dence provides a condition of intelligibility for the human and finite , 
others read it from the seemingly "atheological" horizons provided by the 
immanent frame of much contemporary intellectual culture? In both cases, 
these horizons significantly affect how Kant's interpreters then construe 
both the larger trajectories of his work as well as the central concepts and 
arguments he offers as he moves through the construction of the critical 
project. In neither case, moreover, is a sympathetic or hostile reading of 
the critical project necessarily a function of the extent to which one stands 
within or outside a theological horizon comparable to Kant's. Some of 
Kant's fiercest opponents include those who affirm with him a robust form 
of divine transcendence, while some of those who stand within the imma-
nent frame revere Kant as 'one of its founders. One aim of this article is 
1 Charles Taylor, A Secular Age (Cambridge, Mass: Belknap, 2007); chapter 15 
contains an extensive discussion of "the immanent frame." 
2 The extent to which Kant 's philosophy-or at least the reception of Kant 's 
philosophy-bears responsibility for the emergence of the immanent frame is an 
important issue that will not be directly treated here. See note 6, below, for some 
initial coordinates for such a discussion. 
KANT FROM A CATHOLIC HORIZON 81 
to suggest that recent work on Kant may require both friend and foe alike 
to reconsider where his work is most aptly' positioned with respect to 
fundamental questions about how the human is to be construed in relation 
to the divine, particularly as that relation is theologically rendered in terms 
of "grace." 
The first two sections of this article will serve to explicate and illustrate 
this larger thesis, without, however, attempting to mount a full-scale argu-
ment on its behalf? Against the background of this thesis, my goal in the 
last two sections is then to explore some consequences of reading Kant 
from a horizon delimited by a set of concerns that historically have been 
characteristic of Catholic theological inquiry, especially with respect to 
conditions for human receptivity to grace. In particular, I hope first to 
show how key elements of a Catholic theological anthropology-in con-
trast, for instance, to a Calvinist or Lutheran one-provide a distinctive 
lens for reading Kant's accounts of human moral agency and its role in the 
attainment of the destiny of humankind. I will then briefly discuss how 
reading Kant through such a lens has import not only for an appropriate 
Catholic theological engagement with Kant's work but also for developing 
a more adequate understanding of the properly philosophical mode of his 
own enterprise. Reading Kant from a Catholic theological horizon not only 
helps bring into sharper focus issues key to his philosophical enterprise of 
critique, but it also enriches conversations on matters central to articulat-
ing an ever more adequate theological understanding of human reality as it 
stands in graced relation to God. 
THEOLOGICAL HORIZONS 
My understanding of "theological horizon" can be most readily dis-
played by looking first at one that functions on Kant's own side. Perhaps 
one of the few matters on which almost all readers of Kant are likely to 
agree is that he is persistent in raising questions both at and about the 
limits of human agency and inquiry. In the course of his relentless pursuit 
of these questions, he constantly brings to the surface a range of possibili-
ties for construing the constitutive elements of what it is to be human, 
particularly as these elements function to delimit humanity's unique status 
in the cosmos as the intersection of freedom and nature. The possibilities 
he then frames most pointedly for construing the human frequently con-
cern how, as such a unique intersection of freedom and nature, humanity 
then stands in its finitude with respect to the divine. As a result, the 
3 For a more extensive treatment of this thesis see Philip 1. Rossi , S.J., "Reading 
Kant through Theological Spectacles," in Kant and the New Philosophy of Reli-
gion, ed. Chris Firestone and Stephen Palmquist (Bloomington: Indiana University, 
2006) 107-23. 
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"theological horizon" that functions on Kant 's side arises precisely with 
respect to his characterization of the human as finite. It is limned, not 
surprisingly, by the anthropological question, "What is man?" which he 
articulated as recapitulating the three focal questions for the enterprise of 
critique: "What can I know? What ought I do? What may I hope for?,,4 
Although this horizon frames an inquiry that Kant takes pains to keep 
stringently philosophical, it nonetheless draws that inquiry toward con-
cerns similar to those that contemporary theology explores under the 
heading of "theological anthropology," namely, the shape of the human 
as it is to be viewed within the context of the reality of the divine. Thus, to 
the extent that Kant's inquiry works from within a "theological horizon," 
that horizon is first framed anthropologically. He takes the question of 
how the human stands with respect to the divine to arise-and to arise 
ineluctably-from our unique human status in the cosmos, even as he 
wrestles with the intractability of articulating such a relationship across 
what he understands to be the radical difference between the human and 
the divine.s 
If I am correct in characterizing Kant's own theological horizon by 
reference to his fundamental anthropological concerns with the character 
and shape of human finitude, this by itself does not render the character of 
that horizon, as well as the concerns that give rise to it, obvious or unprob-
lematic to the theological reader. A central point of my larger thesis, 
moreover, is that insofar as our own reading of Kant's texts also requires 
us to frame responses to that famous set of questions about knowledge, 
action, and hope, we will find that their framing places us, at least implic-
4 Immanuel Kant, Lectures on Logic, trans. and ed. J. Michael Young (New 
York: Cambridge University, 1992) 538. The first three questions, without the 
anthropological gloss, are posed in The Critique of Pure Reason, trans. Allen W. 
Wood and Paul Guyer, Cambridge Edition of the Works of Immanuel Kant (New 
York: Cambridge University, 1998), "The Canon of Pure Reason" 677 (A805 /B833 
in the 1st and 2nd German editions) . 
5 Susan Neiman makes this point in a provocative way: "Of the many distinc-
tions Kant took wisdom and sanity to depend on drawing, none was deeper than 
the distinction between God and the rest of us. Kant reminds us as often as possible 
of all that God can do and we cannot. Nobody in the history of philosophy was 
more aware of the number of ways that we can forget it. He was equally conscious 
of the temptation to idolatry, the alternative route to confusing God with other 
beings. Kant's relentless determination to trace the ways we forget our finitude was 
matched only by his awareness that such forgetting was natural" (Evil in Modern 
Thought: An Alternative History of Philosophy [Princeton, N.J.: Princeton Univer-
sity, 2002] 75). The centrality that Neiman gives to this distinction suggests that 
Kant's work still bears the mark of what Robert Sokolowski calls "the Christian 
distinction" between God and the world that is "different from distinctions made 
within the word" (The God of Faith and Reason [Washington: Catholic University 
of America, 1995] xiv). 
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itly, within a horizon in which the finitude of the anthropological impli-
cates the theological. Within this horizon questions about the nature and 
meaning of the human find themselves almost inevitably referenced to 
questions about the nature and meaning of the divine to which the human 
stands in contrast-even, it should be noted, in the case of those who can 
envision a theological horizon to be constituted only in terms of the com-
plete absence of the divine.6 
Kant 's theological horizon stands in a mutually refractive relation to that 
of his readers, so we cannot simply doff our own spectacles to don (only) 
Kant's. More pointedly for my main argument, it may very well be that 
some of the crucial differences that have internally demarcated Christian 
theological traditions from one another with respect to their anthropology, 
especially as these have been articulated since the Reformation, provide a 
helpful set of markers for tracing the theological horizons that function to 
shape different readings of Kant? 
An instructive instance of how such differences function in reading Kant 
can be found in recent treatments of the question of the extent to which his 
understanding of "grace" should be taken to be Pelagian with respect to 
his construal of the capacities of human moral agency. Jacqueline Marina's 
essay, "Kant on Grace: A Reply to his Critics,"S provides a useful road 
map for this dispute, inasmuch as her analysis helps locate at least two 
different theological horizons from which Kant's discussions of grace in 
6 This claim raises at least two crucial questions that are far too large for this 
article to address. One is how to read Kant's texts with respect to the various 
modern forms of theoretical and practical atheism: is he, wittingly or unwittingly 
complicit in legitimating the contemporary intellectual culture of unbelief? A case 
for charging Kant with such complicity can be found in Gordon E. Michalson Jr., 
Kant and the Problem of God (Oxford: Blackwell, 1999). The other is whether it is 
proper to consider atheism-particularly in its modern and contemporary forms-
as itself articulating a position that, at least ironically, is "theological." For some 
historical background useful for the consideration of this second question, see 
Michael J. Buckley, At the Origins of Modern Atheism (New Haven, Conn.: Yale 
University, 1987) and Denying and Disclosing God: The Ambiguous Progress of 
Modern Atheism (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University, 2004). Charles Taylor's A 
Secular Age may also be read as an extended argument that theological questions 
are unavoidable even with the immanent frames of late modernity; see especially 
chapters 16-18. 
7 These markers, shaped from within the context of the Reformation, are not the 
only ones relevant to delimiting the anthropological differences treated in this 
article, but they are particularly important to the extent that articulating them 
points out the particular conceptual care needed in distinguishing, on the one hand, 
questions about the limitations consequent upon human finitude and contingency 
and, on the other, questions about the limitations consequent upon human com-
plicity in sin and evil. 
8 Jacqueline Marina, "Kant on Grace: A Reply to His Critics," Religious Studies 
33 (1997) 379-400. 
84 THEOLOGICAL STUDIES 
relation to human agency can be read. The first, within which grace is 
primarily (or even exclusively) construed as "divine aid" in the face of a 
human incapacity to turn away from sin, places the reading of Kant's 
treatment of moral regeneration in a text such as Religion within the 
Boundaries of Mere Reason9 within a theological horizon delimited by an 
articulation of the problem of justification as it has been classically focused 
by the Reformation: How am I, a helpless sinner, ever to be saved? When 
translated into the concepts of Kant's account of human moral freedom, 
this problematic becomes one of finding logical space for acts of divine 
mercy and graciousness to function within the ambit of the exercise of an 
individual human autonomy that has been flawed by a willful inversion of 
one's incentives for choice. Within this horizon, one has little option but to 
take as Pelagian Kant's emphasis on the individual human agent's responsi-
bility to adopt the categorical imperative as the supreme maxim of choice 
for extricating oneself from "radical evil." Grace and mercy, understood as 
unmerited, have no function in a field of action in which agents bear strict 
accountability for the good or the evil, intended or done, and for the way 
they thus make themselves good or evil. The regeneration of the moral 
agent must be the moral agent's own doing. Within this context, it is not 
surprising that two important defenders of the view that Kant is Pelagian, 
Gordon Michalson and Nicholas Wolterstorff, whom Marina addresses in 
her essay, are authors whose work shows considerable familiarity with 
key issues about the status and stance of the human in the face . of the 
divine-i.e., with issues of theological anthropology-that have pre-
occupied certain strands of Protestant theology since the Reformation. lO 
9 This is the translation of the title of Kant's 1793 Die Religion innnerhalb der 
Grenzen der blofJen Vernunft used in Religion and Rational Theology, Cambridge 
Edition of the Works of Immanuel Kant, trans. and ed. Allen W. Wood and 
George Di Giovanni (New York: Cambridge University, 1996). There are currently 
13 volumes in this edition, which, on completion, is likely to serve as the standard 
locus for English language access to Kant's work. 
10 In addition to their writings on Kant, Gordon E. Michalson lr. has published 
articles on Bultmann ("Bultmann's Metaphysical Dualism," Religion in Life 44 
[1975] 453-61) and Pannenberg ("Pannenberg on the Resurrection and Historical 
Method," Scottish Journal of Theology 33 [1980] 345-59); as well as a monograph 
on Lessing (Lessing 's 'Ugly Ditch': A Study of Theology and History [University 
Park: Pennsylvania State University, 1985]). Nicholas Wolterstorff has published 
articles on Calvin and Locke on the assurance of faith ("The Assurance of Faith," 
Faith and Philosophy 7 [1990] 396-417); Calvin on sacraments ("Not Presence But 
Action: Calvin on Sacraments," Perspectives 9 [1994]16-22) and on social injustice 
("The Wounds of God: Calvin's Theology of Social Injustice," Reformed Journal 
37 [1987] 14-22); Barth on evil ("Barth on Evil," Faith and Philosophy 13 [1996] 
584-608); as well as a monograph that has Barth as a main interlocutor (Divine 
Discourse: Philosophical Reflections on the Claim That God Speaks [New York: 
Cambridge University, 1995]). 
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Reading Kant against a theological horizon formed by reference to the 
Reformation problematic of justification thus supports a view that if grace 
functions at all in his account of human moral agency, it must do so first 
and foremost (and, perhaps, exclusively) as an exercise of divine aid to 
initiate or assist the moral regeneration of the agent enmeshed in the 
"radical evil" of her own making. In contrast to this, Marina proposes that 
another understanding of grace is primary for Kant, namely, that "[his] 
most general and principal conception of grace ... can be defined simply 
as 'God's unmerited favour' , to which the individual can relate both prac-
tically and existentially.,,11 Marina argues that Kant envisions a universal 
function for grace in constituting the unconditioned moral worth of 
humans, whereby God establishes a relation with us "before any act on 
our part. ,, 12 Grace thus operates in the relational context constitutive of 
human moral agency so that "the very possibility of our doing good rests 
on grace.,,13 In consequence, grace operates at a structural level of the 
human even more fundamental than that implicated in "moral regenera-
tion": grace functions principally as the fundamental form of divine rela-
tion to the human that is prior to any moment of "divine aid" with respect 
to particular human activities. 14 
Marina sets her argument for the primacy of this more general notion of 
grace in the context of a theological horizon that stands in explicit contrast 
to that delimited solely by the problem of justification. She first contends 
that "this general notion of grace is not simply a response to the problem 
of radical evil. If it were merely this, the problem of evil would define the 
contours of that which is needed to solve it, namely grace. ,,15 Within this 
larger context, moreover, the notion of grace has crucial anthropological 
ramifications: "more importantly, the upshot of the theological concept of 
grace has more to do with our posture vis-a-vis God than with the meta-
physical subtleties of divine freedom .... The divine/human relationship is 
established by God with us before any act on our part, and this means that 
all that we can do is to be receptive of God's grace.,,16 The "horizon of 
grace" in which Marina places Kant is thus one in which the role of grace is 
primarily relational with respect to the very constitution of human agency 
11 Marina, "Kant on Grace" 385. 
13 Ibid. 399. 
12 Ibid. 383, italics original. 
14 A crucial consequence of this shift is that it offers a mode of construing divine 
activity "in" and "on" the world that need not be "interventionist." See David 
Burrell, "Divine Action and Human Freedom in the Context of Creation"; and 
Kathryn Tanner, "Human Freedom, Human Sin and God the Creator," in The God 
Who A cts: Philosophical and Theological Explorations, ed. Thomas F. Tracy (Uni-
versity Park: Pennsylvania State University, 1994) 101-9, 111-35. 
15 Marina,. "Kant on Grace" 385, italics original. 
16 Ibid. 383, italics original. 
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rather than primarily or even exclusively forensic with respect to the resto-
ration of an "original" justification that has been 10st.17 
Marina's account of Kant's treatment of grace consequently places his 
discussion of grace as the "divine aid" that functions in moral regeneration 
within a more general concept of grace for which "there is an intrinsic 
connection between the universality of the moral law, grounded in the 
absolute worth of all rational creatures, and the concept of unmerited 
grace. Only if we think of a holy will as gracious to all rational creatures, 
and as therefore universal in scope, can we preserve a significant sense of 
the unmerited character of grace."lS This, Marina concludes, places Kant's 
account within a theological horizon of grace that, marked deeply by 
Augustinianism, not only "strays far from the Reformation view which 
sought to comprehend justification in forensic terms" but also places 
"[Kant's] doctrine of grace ... much closer to Rome.,,19 
A CATHOLIC KANT? 
From the perspective typical of the Catholic neo-Scholastic thinking-
epitomized by Cardinal Desire-Joseph Mercier's analysis in his 1891 essay 
"The Two Critiques of Kant" -that well into the 20th century took Kant to 
be a subjectivist, Marina 's placement of Kant as close to Rome in any 
theological matter would undoubtedly come as a surprise.2o It should be 
less of a surprise-though hardly uncontroversial- to other readers of 
17 The proposal that Marina makes here may also be understood as a shift to a 
perspective that views grace first of all in relation to the contingency and finitude of 
creatiQn. It thus opens possibilities for enlarging the locus of the significance of 
Kant 's work for theological anthropology beyond issues of justification and soteri-
ology by repositioning it in reference to creation and thus to what Sokolowski 
terms "the Christian distinction" (see n. 5 above). 
18 Marina, "Kant on Grace" 384. 
19 Ibid. 400. For another perspective on the relation of Kant's account of moral 
agency and radical evil to both Catholic and Protestant treatments of original sin, 
see Robert Merrihew Adams, "Original Sin: A Study in the Interaction of Philoso-
phy and Theology," The Question of Christian Philosophy Today , ed. Francis J. 
Ambrisio (New York: Fordham University, 1999) 80-110. 
20 Desere Joseph Mercier, "The Two Critiques of Kant," in Cardinal Mercier's 
Philosophical Essays: A Study in Neo- Thomism, ed. David A. Boileau (Leuven: 
Peeters, 2002) 137-50. Mercier, prior to becoming cardinal archbishop of Malines 
(1906), "had a long and successful career as a university lecturer" and founded the 
Institute for Higher Philosophical Studies at Louvain in 1894, which became a 
major center for neo-Thomism in the 20th century. His own interests focused on 
epistemology, and he "defended the universal and necessary judgments of the 
intellect against the positivism of his day and what he took to be the subjectivism 
of Kant" (Gerald A. McCool, The Neo-Thomists [Milwaukee: Marquette Univer-
sity, 1994] 36-37). Another typical instance of a subjectivist reading of Kant 
from an early 20th-century neo-Thomist perspective can be found in the entry, 
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Kant who recognize that, as a philosopher, Kant is not concerned to mea-
sure his account of theological matters by reference to the interpretation of 
any particular Christian doctrinal tradition: it need not be a philosophical 
sin to be theologically eclectic. So while I do think that, starting from an 
interpretation such as Marina's, a plausible case can be made that Kant 
articulates a philosophical anthropology congruent in its main points with 
a Christian theological anthropology, this kind of larger account still can-
not be fully identified with that of a single historically articulated theologi-
cal tradition such as Lutheran, Calvinist, or Catholic. With regard to the 
particular function of a concept such as grace within that anthropology, 
however, one may be able to locate Kant 's views more successfully on such 
a theological map-with the proviso that the orientation for locating him 
on any particular theological map may itself be a function of the theologi-
cal horizon of the one using the map. 
One might then argue that the differences between the at least "quasi-
Catholic" Kant of Marina and the "Pelagian" Kant of Michalson, Wolter-
storff, et al. result primarily from differences in the theological horizon from 
which Kant is being read by each interpreter. A case of this kind seems all the 
more plausible if one recognizes that the theological perspective from which 
Marina reads Kant has striking resemblances to two important 20th-century 
articulations of Catholic theology that bear upon the anthropological import 
of grace: (1) the transcendental Thomism that traces its origin to the efforts 
of Joseph Marechal to engage Kant's critical philosophy, not primarily as a 
representative form of subjectivism, but as a serious conversation partner 
with which to engage the work of Thomas Aquinas;21 and (2) the movement 
of La nouvelle thCoLogie that in the mid-20th century challenged the then 
regnant Catholic theological paradigm of the relation between grace and 
nature. The particular horizon from which Marina reads Kant's "general 
concept of grace" is closely aligned with the horizon of grace that Karl 
Rahner delimits in terms of his notion of a "supernatural existential" as a 
"real, ontological and unexacted ordination to God.,,22 For her part, Marina 
relates the universality of grace to "the unconditioned worth of all rational 
beings, and hence, to the morallaw,'.23 and then takes such universality to be 
a mark of the gratuity with which grace is bestowed: 
When we say that grace is freely given, what we mean is that it is not something 
owed to us in virtue of some special characteristic we possess setting us apart from 
"The Philosophy of Immanuel Kant," in The Catholic Encyclopedia (1907-1912), 
htW:llwww.newadvent.org/cathen/08603a.htm (accessed July 16, 2009) . 
. See Rossi, "Reading Kant through Theological Spectacles" 115-17. 
22 Karl Rahner, "The Theological Concept of Concupiscientia," in Theological 
Investigations 1, trans. Cornelius Ernst (Baltimore: Helicon, 1965) 376-77. 
23 Marina, "Kant on Grace" 385. 
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others, or in virtue of something we do making us special. Our actions do not 
constrain God to confer any good upon us or to enter into relation with us. The 
divine/human relationship is established by God with us before any act on our part, 
and this means that all that we can do is to be receptive of God's grace?4 
Two features of Marina 's treatment are worth noting. First, she draws 
attention to the universal function of grace in constituting the uncondi-
tioned moral worth of humans whereby God establishes a relation with us 
"before any act on our part. " Second, she argues that grace is operative in 
the relational context constitutive of human moral agency so that "the very 
possibility of our doing good rests on grace.,,25 These features taken 
together resemble a key contention made both by proponents of la nou-
velle theologie and by transcendental Thomists. On their part, they both 
argued for the primacy of understanding grace as a constantly offered 
invitation of relationship with the divine that functions at the level of the 
fundamental human dynamisms of knowledge and desire.26 They main-
tained that such a relational construal of grace comports better with an 
integral and holistic understanding of the human than did the then domi-
nant neo-Thomist emphasis on grace as a "transient elevating motion" that 
works upon particular moments of human activity within a bifurcated 
account of the human.27 
I point out the affinities between Marina's interpretation of Kant's 
account of grace and a notion such as Rahner's "supernatural existential" 
not primarily to engage in discussion about the appropriateness · of the 
latter notion as an element within a Catholic theology of grace, but rather 
to stimulate an exploration of the dynamics that enter into reading Kant-
or any, philosopher for that matter-from a particular theological horizon, 
be it explicit or implicit. I hope that I have already made a case for taking 
seriously the possibility that-to put it in the broadest possible terms-
given their historical differences with respect to theological anthropology, 
Catholics are likely to read Kant differently than Calvinists, for instance, 
and that they are each in turn likely to read him differently than Luther-
ans. It is also likely that any of these readings will, in turn, display differ-
ences from those conducted within the immanent frame of a resolutely 
secularist horizon with its putatively atheological anthropology. 
These differences, however, do not seem simply to lie athwart these 
larger distinctions among Christian theological traditions but also follow 
other fault lines within and across these traditions. Thus it is likely that, to 
24 Ibid. 383; see also the passage on 384 cited in n. 16 above. 
25 Ibid. 399. 
26 In private correspondence, Marina has confirmed this affinity between her 
reading of Kant on grace and the views of a theologian such as Rahner. 
27 Gerald A. McCool, S.l. , From Unity to Pluralism: The Internal Evolution of 
Thomism (New York: Fordham University, 1989) 206. 
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an Arminian, Marina's defense of Kant against Pelagianism would seem 
unnecessary; while to a neo-Thomist conviriced of Kant's ineradicable 
subjectivism, as well as to a Barthian for whom such philosophical specula-
tion borders on the idolatrous, such a defense would be hopelessly mis-
guided. As the differences between Mercier and Marina indicate, 
moreover, "Catholic" readings of Kant range from the Kant who functions 
as an iconic "adversarius" of the neo-Scholastic manuals, to the Kant who 
is the object of the thoroughgoing scholarship of a Giovanni Sala or a 
Franc;:ois Marty, to the Kant who is a central interlocutor for the philosoph-
ical theology of a Richard Schaeffler. 28 
Though there are many different faces to such a "Catholic Kant," it may 
yet be possible to discern under some of them a common set of concerns 
28 There is notable European Catholic scholarship on Kant that has moved sig-
nificantly beyond an earlier neo-Scholastic/neo-Thomist dismissive polemic. Gio-
vanni Sala has produced important historical/textual studies of Kant (Kant und die 
Frage nach Gott: Gottesbeweise und Gottesbeweiskritik in den Schriften Kants [Ber-
lin: de Gruyter, 1990]), as well as work that engages Kant critically from the 
perspective of Lonergan (Das Apriori in der menschlichen Erkenntnis: Eine Studie 
ilber Kants Kritik der reinen Vernunft und Lonergans Insight [Meisenheim am 
Glan: A. Hain, 1971]; and Lonergan and Kant: Five Essays on Human Knowledge 
[Toronto: University of Toronto,1994]). Richard Schaeffler has constructively 
engaged Kant 's philosophy of religion and the Kantian question of hope: Was 
Dilrfen wir Hoffen: Die katholische Theologie der Hoffnung zwischen Blochs uto-
pischem Denken und der reformatorischen Rechtfertigungslehre (Darmstadt: Wis-
senschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 1979); Religionsphilosophie (Freiburg: K. Alber, 
1983). In France, Fran90is Marty (L'homme, habitant du monde: A l'horizon de la 
pensee critique de Kant [Paris: H. Champion, 2004]) and Henri d 'Aviau de Ternay 
(La liberte kantienne: Un imperatif d'exode [Paris: Cerf, 1992]; Traces bibliques 
dans la loi morale chez Kant [Paris: Beauchesne, 1986]) have offered sympathetic 
readings of key metaphysical and moral motifs in Kant's philosophy. Perhaps the 
most significant rereadings of Kant with respect to Catholic philosophy and theol-
ogy have emerged in Germany from the work of Aloysius Winter (Der andere Kant: 
Zur philosophischen Theologie Immanuel Kants [New York: Olms, 2000]), in a 
collection of essays edited by Fran90is Marty and Friedo Ricken (Kant iiber Reli-
gion [Stuttgart: Kohhammer, 1992]), and in two volumes edited by Norbert Fischer 
(Kants Metaphysik und Religionsphilosophie [Hamburg: Meiner, 2004] and Kant 
und der Katholizismus: Stationen einer wechselhaften Geschichte [Freiburg: Herder, 
2005]). At the presentation of the latter volume, Fischer delivered a lecture pro-
vocatively titled Milssen Katholiken weiterhin Furcht vor Kant haben?: Kants 
Philosophie als "ancilla theologiae" (Eichstatt: Universitatsverlag Kastner 2005). 
Important recent scholarship is exemplified in Ulrich Lehner's examination of the 
theological context of Kant's work and its Catholic reception, particularly prior to 
the placing of the Critique of Pure Reason on the Index in 1827 (Kants Vorsehungs-
konzept auf dem Hintergrund der deutschen Schulphilosophie und -theologie 
[Boston: Brill, 2007]). For an overview of the reception of Kant within Catholic 
philosophy and theology in the United States, see Philip Rossi, S.l ., "Die Bedeutung 
der Philosophie Immanuel Kants flir die gegenwartige katholische Theologie in den 
Vereinigten Staaten von Amerika," in Kant und der Katholizismus 441-60. 
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that shape the interrogation of Kant's texts. There may be a discernible set 
of common "Catholic questions" that guide such readings, even when 
those who ask them take Kant's text to yield quite different, even 
conflicting, answers. These concerns, I believe, constitute a kind of "Cath-
olic theological interrogation" of Kant's anthropology, i.e., his account of 
how the human, as the unique juncture of nature and freedom, stands with 
relation to the divine. I suspect that the most important connecting thread 
through all these concerns may be drawn though questions about grace and 
its functioning in, and as the dynamic of, the divine/human relationship, 
but I will not try to show that here. Instead I will , first, propose what I see 
as three of the focal questions for such a theological interrogation. Second, 
I will briefly explore how different visages of a "Catholic Kant" emerge in 
consequence of these questions. Finally, I will conclude by suggesting why 
the aspects of Kant's treatment of "how the human stands with respect to 
the divine" that get highlighted from such a "Catholic interrogation" are 
worthy of further discussion both from the side of Kant scholarship and 
from that of theological inquiry. 
A CATHOLIC I NTERROGA TlON OF KANT 
The focal questions for a "Catholic interrogation" of Kant, I suggest, 
coordinate major elements of Kant's account of the human with a set of 
concerns historically characteristic of Catholic theology. The first question 
pertains to the capacity of the of human conscience, through its deliver-
ances about moral truth and responsibility, to mark a reliable path to the 
acknowledgment of the divine. On Kant's side, this question bears globally 
upon his understanding of human moral agency, but more specifically 
upon his key claim that "morality thus inevitably leads to religion," which 
I take to include his much controverted "moral argument for God.,,29 On 
the Catholic side this question arises in its most general form from a 
commitment to the mutual congruence of faith and reason and, more 
29 The claim that "morality thus inevitably leads to religion" is one that Kant 
makes in his preface to Religion within the Boundaries of Mere Reason, trans. and 
ed. George Di Giovanni, under the title, Religion and Rational Theology, ed. Allen 
W. Wood and George Di Giovanni, Cambridge Edition of the Works of Immanuel 
Kant (New York: Cambridge University, 1996) 59. A full overview of Kant's 
"moral argument," which he' articulates in a number of texts, can be found in Allen 
W. Wood, Kant's Moral Religion (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University, 1970). Two 
helpful brief treatments of the major concerns and arguments in Kant's treatment 
of religion are Allen W. Wood, "Rational Theology, Moral Faith, and Religion," in 
The Cambridge Companion to Kant, ed. Paul Guyer (New York: Cambridge Uni-
versity, 1992) 395-416; and Frederick C. Beiser, "Moral Faith and the Highest 
Good," in The Cambridge Companion to Kant and Modern Philosophy, ed. Paul 
Guyer (New York: Cambridge University, 2006) 588- 629. 
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particularly, from claims about the capacity of human reason to discern 
truth in the form of "natural law"-and, from the discernment of that 
truth, for a person to be then rendered open to a fully graced relation with 
God. The second question concerns the extent to which there is an inher-
ently social dimension to the ultimate destiny of humankind. On Kant's 
side, this question bears upon his notion of the human moral community as 
a "kingdom of ends" and the role this community plays in the attainment 
of human moral destiny. It is a question about the answer(s) that Kant 
finally gives to the third of his famous questions, transformed into its plural 
form: "For what may we hope?" On the Catholic side, this is a question 
about both eschatology and ecclesiology, one that might be provocatively 
posed in dialogue with Kant as a question about the relationship between 
"the communion of saints" and "the kingdom of ends. " The third question 
concerns Kant 's understanding of (the order of) creation and of the funda-
mental character of the divine difference from and relation to the human. 
It bears upon Kant's construal of causality, and upon his distinction 
between regulative and constitutive uses of the notions of "God," "world," 
and "self/soul." On the Catholic side, this is a question not only about the 
doctrine of creation but also about the capacity of particular realities in the 
order of creation to function as efficacious signs of divine reality-i.e., a 
question about the possibility of affirming the reality of the world and of 
what takes place in it as sacramental.30 
I will here pursue only the first line of questioning, in part because of 
constraints of space, but also because this line of questioning reveals some 
of the different "faces" of Kant discernible in Catholic readings of his 
texts . In his essay on "The Two Critiques of Kant," Mercier depicts one 
of the more familiar faces, a portrait by no means confined only to Catho-
lic readings of Kant: this is Kant, the moral subjectivist, who is woefully 
mistaken in his confidence that, by closing the speculative path to an 
affirmation of God, "critique" provides what is needed to secure passage 
to God along the route of moral certainty. Mercier depicts one variant of a 
type of Kantian "face" that emerges from what has long been a standard 
account of Kant's ethics given by friend and foe alike. 
This account has at its core some version of three claims about Kant's 
ethics: 
(1) Inasmuch as it is concerned with the formal features of human ratio-
nality, it does not require us to have a notion of human nature or to 
develop a moral anthropology. 
30 This last question is the one for which I think it would be most difficult to 
extract an unambiguously Catholic answer from Kant's texts. 
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(2) Inasmuch as it is deontological and concerned with what is "right," it 
stands as the paradigmatic contrast to teleological ethics, concerned 
with what is "good," such as that found in Aristotle. 
(3) Inasmuch as it is concerned with the moral integrity of the individual 
choices I make as a moral agent, it requires neither the development of 
an account of moral virtue nor a social philosophy. 
While these three claims may not seem to have direct bearing upon the truth 
or adequacy of Kant's claim that "morality leads ineluctably to religion," 
anyone versed in the ways Catholic theology has typically treated "natural 
law" as a source of reliable moral knowledge will recognize a number of 
salient features in these claims that set Kant's ethics over against claims 
about moral agency and moral knowledge as typically framed by a natural 
law perspective. In place of an understanding of practical reason as a firmly 
rooted "participation ... in the wisdom of the divine Creator and Law-
giver,,,31 Kant seems to posit an understanding of "rationality" as a formal , 
abstract procedure that is not affected by the specifics of our human condi-
tion: I make decisions as a moral agent abstracted from the particularities of 
this time and this place, as a member of a timeless "intelligible world." 
Posed in these terms, Kant's account of morality seems quite literally 
abstracted from the flesh and blood reality of human beings who have to 
make moral decisions in the concrete circumstances of daily life; it is 
the ethics of a cold and stern Prussian taskmaster, suited more to the dis-
embodied rationality of angels than to living and breathing human beings. 
Even more damaging and damning, the formality of Kant 's ethics leads 
some to hold that it lies behind the pleadings of the Eichmanns of the world: 
"I was only carrying out my orders," or, in the powerful description of Iris 
Murdoch, that it leads to the very antithesis of a Christian moral agency: 
How recognizable, how familiar to us, is the man so beautifully portrayed in the 
Groundwork, who confronted even with Christ turns away to consider the judg-
ment of his own conscience and to hear the voice of his reason . .. . This man is with 
us still, free, independent, lonely, powerful, rational, responsible, brave, the hero of 
so many novels and books of moral philosophy .. .. He is the ideal citizen of the 
liberal State, a warning held up to tyrants .... Kant's man had already received a 
glorious incarnation nearly a century earlier in the work of Milton: His proper 
name is Lucifer.32 
I will not dispute the vi,ew that this portrayal of Kantian moral agency 
has been highly influential as an icon of modernity and enlightenment at 
31 Pope John Paul II, Veritatis splendor no. 40. 
32 Iris Murdoch, The Sovereignty of Good (New York: Schocken, 1971) 80. 
Murdoch's later treatment of Kant in Metaphysics as a Guide to Morals (New 
York: Penguin, 1982) offers a more complex and sympathetic account of his view 
of moral agency than is represented in this quotation . 
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many levels of European and North American culture during the last two 
centuries; nor will I set forth here the reasons why I think that this por-
trayal does not, in fact, accurately present Kant's own more complex view 
of moral agency or do justice to the richness of his understanding of 
"reason. ,,33 Of greater import, for my purposes, is the fact that this por-
trayal of the Kantian moral agent, as well as the three claims of the 
standard account that lend it plausibility, are themselves representative of 
a larger account of Kant's critical enterprise. Recent scholarship has sug-
gested that this reading of his enterprise is problematic in at least two 
major respects: first, it takes anthropological, teleological, and social con-
siderations to be, at best, marginal to the goals and scope of that project; 
second, it permits or presumes a bifurcation of theoretical and practical 
uses of reason by discounting or dismissing as ineffective Kant's continual 
assertions of the unity of the reason that engages the world both theoreti-
cally and practically. 
I think it is easy to see why the lineaments of such a disembodied, 
disconnected, autonomously self-sufficient Kantian moral subject were 
readily taken by a revived and renewed Thomism to be representative of 
the most problematic features of modern philosophy. These were features 
from which one could trace the progression by which the Cartesian cogito 
and the dualism of the res extensa and the res cogitans culminated in even 
more recalcitrant Kantian dualisms: the external one of phenomenon and 
noumenon, matched by the internal one of apperception and autonomy in 
the Kantian subject. Neo-Thomism certainly grappled with dualisms and 
dualities within its own enterprise-a number of which, significantly, were 
at the core of the controversy over the account of grace proposed by La 
nouvelle theoLogie. Even so, it could nonetheless claim advantage over all 
the varied subjectivisms of modern philosophy by virtue of two of his core 
features: its studied and intentional bypassing of the Cartesian cogito as 
starting point for philosophical inquiry, as well its reaffirmation of an 
epistemic realism grounded on an Aristotelian-Thomist dynamism of 
potency and act. In their respective contexts, the standard philosophical 
reading of Kant as the inheritor of an enclosed Cartesian subjectivity and 
33 Two useful alternative readings of Kantian agency can be found in Jeanine 
Grenberg, Kant and the Ethics of Humility: A Story of Dependence, Corruption, 
and Virtue (New York: Cambridge University, 2005); and G. Felicitas Munzel , 
Kant's Concept of Moral Character: The "Critical" Link of Morality, Anthropology, 
and Reflective Judgment (Chicago: University of Chicago, 1999); Susan Neiman, 
The Unity of Reason: Rereading Kant (New York: Oxford University, 1994); and 
Onora O 'Neill, Constructions of Reason: Explorations of Kant 's Practical Philoso-
phy (New York: Cambridge University, 1989) have each proposed ways of under-
standing Kant's notion of reason that attend to more than the formal features that 
have characterized much prior Kant interpretation. 
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the resolute a- and anti-modernity of much neo-Thomism made them a 
good adversarial match for each other. 
Recent historical and interpretive scholarship has questioned some key 
elements of these accounts of Kant's moral philosophy and of his critical 
enterprise which, at least in English-language discussions, have enjoyed 
interpretive preeminence for much of the 20th century. This scholarship 
has started to highlight a number of elements previously considered mar-
ginal within the larger critical enterprise and to reconsider the shape and 
role of moral philosophy within that larger project. Thus, in contrast to the 
standard account in which Kant's ethics is construed in terms of a formality 
that abstracts it from considerations of teleology, anthropology, and virtue, 
recent work on Kant's ethics, particularly by attending to the larger con-
text in which Kant himself places his writings on morality, has argued that 
these putative "un-Kantian" notions do, in fact, playa key role in his 
account of the structure and dynamics of human morallife?4 With regard 
to Kant's larger critical enterprise, a renewed interest in the function of the 
Critique of the Power of Judgment,35 as well as in the bearing of Kant's 
other writings of the late 1780s and 1790s upon his own developing under-
standing of critique, has started to displace the Critique of Pure Reason as 
the primary interpretive lens for reading the entire project. As crucial as 
that initial critical volume remains, it can no longer be read as some kind 
of master blueprint guiding the construction of even such major compo-
nents as the two later works Kant also titled Critique. One result of such a 
reassessment has been to lessen the plausibility of the picture of "Kant the 
adversary" that had been a staple of neo-Scholastic manuals and textbooks 
through at least the middle of the 20th century. 
A foreshadowing of this interpretive shift in a Catholic reading of Kant 
can be found by comparing the treatment James Collins offered in A 
History of Modern European Philosophy (1953)36 with the one he 
provided in The Emergence of Philosophy of Religion (1967)?7 Collins, 
34 Allen Wood has been a key figure in effecting such a shift. Among other 
major contributors are Marcia Baron, Jeanine Grenberg, Paul Guyer, Barbara 
Herman, Robert Louden, G. Felicitas Munzel, Susan Neiman, Onora O 'Neill, 
Roger Sullivan, and Richard Velkley. The historical studies of Frederick Beiser 
and John Zammito have also been important, as has been Alan Donagan's The 
Theory of Morality (Chicago: University of Chicago, 1977), which argued that Kant 
and Aquinas stand in far closer affinity in their understanding of the first principle 
of the moral law than many of the then-standard accounts of either thinker recog-
nized. 
35 This is the translation given to the title of Kant's 1790 Kritik der Urteilskraft in 
The Cambridge Edition of the Works of Immanuel Kant, trans. Paul Guyer and 
Eric Matthews (New York: Cambridge University, 2000). 
36 Milwaukee: Bruce, 1953. 
37 New Haven, Conn.: Yale University, 1967. 
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arguably one of the most erudite scholars and influential teachers in the 
mid-20th-century Catholic philosophical community, wrote the former 
"primarily as a textbook for students who have some acquaintance with 
Scholastic philosophy,,,38 and in which "a critical appraisal is also made, 
from the Thomistic standpoint, of some of the particular arguments 
offered by the philosopher in question.,,39 In that work, he makes the 
unsurprising summary conclusion, clearly in accord with the standard lines 
of neo-Scholastic criticism, that "Kant reduced the content of religion to 
morality.,,4o In the latter work, written not as a textbook, but as a substan-
tial historical interpretation (of which Collins was a master), his aim was to 
investigate "the insistence on the part of many modern philosophers that 
their inquiry into our knowledge of God was only a part of a larger inquiry 
into the religious relationship between man and God.,,41 His chapter titled 
"Kant's Moral Radication of Religion,,42 explores crucial ways in which he 
finds , contrary to the conclusions of standard anti-Kant polemic, Kant's 
account of the relationship between morality and religion to be, in intent 
and result, clearly nonreductive. At the time of its publication, Collins's 
work was pioneering both for its nonreductivist reading of Kant in matters 
of religion and for the constructive way it engaged that account from a 
philosophical perspective shaped by Catholic theological concerns.43 Yet, 
perhaps as a result of a deeply entrenched view of Kant that saw him as the 
lineal and logical inheritor of a self-enclosed Cartesian subjectivism, Col-
lins's work seems to have had little immediate impact on altering the way 
Kant was read either by Kant scholars and philosophers of religion in the 
secular academy or by Catholic philosophers and theologians. 
Although the landscapes both of Kant scholarship and of Catholic philo-
sophical and theological engagement with Kant have altered considerably 
since Collins 's The Emergence of Philosophy of Religion, the full linea-
ments of this new philosophical picture of Kant, the critical project, and 
the anthropological issues that guide its trajectory have yet to emerge. This 
is due in part to the fact that so far it remains an uncompleted mosaic to 
which workers from various philosophical and theological vantage points 
continue to make contributions. A part of the mosaic that has started to 
take shape is its retrieval of the social dimensions of Kant's account of 
hope, a dimension with crucial bearing upon how Kant construes the 
cultural, political, and religious dynamics that provide the conditions for 
38 Collins, A History of Modern European Philosophy iii. 
39 Ibid. iv. 40 Ibid. 541. 
41 Collins, The Emergence of Philosophy of Religion vii. 
42 Ibid. 129-66. 
43 See also the final chapter, "Tasks for a Realistic Theism," in The Emergence 
of Philosophy of Religion 423-91. 
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fulfillment of this hope.44 As I suggested earlier, this social reading of Kant 
offers a number of points for interrogation from the side of ecclesiology 
and eschatology: How does Kant construe the destiny of humankind and 
the roles we, both individually and socially, need to play in it? Is there 
(conceptual) space for grace or divine providence to playa role in Kant's 
account of the attainment of human destiny?45 How does Kant's account 
of these matters comport with the various ways Christian theology has 
construed the pathway to the attainment of human destiny? These are not 
new questions, but I think that there is at least a twofold reason for raising 
them again. First, as I hope discussion of Marina 's analysis of Kant's 
alleged Pelagianism has shown, it may prove useful to frame these ques-
tions with an explicit awareness of the theological horizons that are 
brought to the interrogation. One can readily miss the possibility that Kant 
may have a universal concept of unmerited grace if all one is looking for is 
the grace that brings about forensic justification. Second, the emerging 
new profile of Kant's (moral and religious) anthropology suggests that we 
may receive answers different from the ones we previously took them to 
have-answers that, however they stand with respect to doctrinal ortho-
doxy, may nonetheless merit serious theological attention. 
TRAJECTORIES FOR THE FUTURE 
This shift on the side of philosophical interpretations of Kant, at least 
with regard to his moral philosophy and its relationship to his accounts of 
religion, society, and culture, has been intriguing to me on several levels. I 
have found myself participating in a shifting of horizons of Catholic read-
, 
44 In rereading of the role of hope in Kant's work, I have observed that recent 
commentators differ from the standard view that sees him as an exemplar of 
Enlightenment optimism. Wood and Neiman both consider it important to distin-
guish Kant 's account of hope from various forms of optimistic belief in the inevita-
bility of "progress," particularly in matters of human moral life and conduct. 
Wood, for instance, remarks: "The only hope Kant thinks we can entertain is for 
an endless, uncertain, painful (and occasionally interrupted) progress from bad 
toward better" (Kant 'S Ethical Thought [New York: Cambridge University, 1999] 
320). And Neiman, commenting on the "minimalist" character of the "signpost" 
Kant erected as support for hope in moral progress, observes: "Still, the poverty of 
Kant's example should forever give the lie to the myth of Enlightenment optimism. 
If the only sign of hope he could find to sustain him was the hope felt by distant 
observers contemplating the French Revolution, Enlightenment expectations were 
slight indeed" (Moral Clarity: A Guide for Grown-up Idealists [Orlando: Harcourt, 
2008] 278- 79). 
45 A useful point of reference from which to start such a discussion can be found 
in Pauline Kleingeld, "Nature or Providence? On the Theoretical and Moral 
Importance of Kant's Philosophy of History," American Catholic Philosophical 
Quarterly 75 (2001) 201-19. 
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ings of Kant: first , as a long-time student of Kant 's work, but also as one 
whose initial philosophical formation was under the tutelage of a faculty 
influenced by the Marechalian heritage and while Karl Rahner was among 
the most influential Catholic theologians; second, as a faculty member for 
over three decades in a large department of Catholic theology in which I 
have regularly found Kant-or at least the putative heritage of Kant-
looming large in the background of discussions of key theological issues 
that have occupied both Catholic and Protestant theology for the last two 
centuries. My role in that theological context is often to remind students 
and colleagues-and myself-of the importance of attending to distinc-
tions, the task that Robert Sokolowski has characterized as "the method 
of philosophy. ,,46 One of the distinctions I regularly invoke is that between 
what theologian (or theological school) X took Kant to hold on topic Y, 
and what, on the basis of his texts and their contexts, Kant, in fact, held on 
topic Y. The former, of course, is often of greater importance histori-
cally-a case in point being Mercier's reading of Kant, as well as that of 
much of the neo-Thomist tradition: the views of the Kant against whom 
they argued bear, in far too many instances, a tenuous relation to the views 
that can be most plausibly construed from his texts, particularly when 
those texts are read with attention to Kant's own historical context. Still, 
it was the reading of Kant as relativist and subjectivist that dominated 
discussion. It is also well to remember that the neo-Thomist tradition has 
hardly been alone in reading Kant to suit its own larger purposes, whether 
theological or philosophical. The Kant of the mid-20th-century Anglo-
American analytic tradition is starting to become just as quaint with 
respect both to more recent Kant scholarship and to various philosophical 
and theological postmodernisms. 
How, then, do matters currently stand regarding current Catholic inter-
rogations of Kant? Trends in recent Kant scholarship have suggested that 
Kant's anthropology can legitimately be read in ways considerably more 
"friendly" to Catholic theological concerns than were the readings of Kant 
typical of Catholic philosophy and theology for much of the 20th century.47 
As already noted, these more recent readings of Kant show considerable 
congruence with the kind of theological anthropology articulated by 
46 Robert Sokolowski, "The Method of Philosophy: Making Distinctions," 
Review of Metaphysics 51 (1998) 515-32. 
47 Recent efforts to read Kant as "theologically friendly" from Evangelical per-
spectives are found in the work of Chris L. Firestone, Nathan Jacobs, and Stephen 
Palmquist. Firestone has most recently published Kant and Theology at the Bound-
aries of Reason (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2009); he and Jacobs authored In Defense of 
Kant's Religion (Bloomington: Indiana University, 2008); and he and Palmquist 
edited Kant and the New Philosophy of Religion (see n. 3 above). See also Palm-
quist Kant's Critical Religion (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2000). 
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theologians in the tradition of "transcendental Thomism," who read both 
Thomas and Kant in terms of an Augustinian dynamic orienting and 
ordering our (finite) human capacities along a trajectory toward the divine. 
But it is important to note that these readings also comport well with some 
of the larger Catholic anthropological themes of which that specific tradi-
tion is just one articulation.48 Thus a Kantian anthropology in which the 
social character of human activity is deeply inscribed in all its uses is more 
resonant than dissonant with Catholic affirmations that our human reality 
is inherently social-and all the more so inasmuch as they both can be 
understood to take that social character to be a fundamental correlate to 
the respect due the dignity of each human person. If Kant uses his basic 
claim that "morality leads ineluctably to religion" to construct a subtle 
account of how a steadfast moral life implicates recognition of the reality 
of a God who stands over against the vicissitudes of human life, Catholics 
have in Kant an intellectual ally for their projects. For instance, a sympa-
thetic Catholic reading of Kant could open up possibilities for an extensive 
constructive engagement with John Paul II's repeated vigorous affirma-
tions that "moral conscience does not close man within an insurmountable 
and impenetrable solitude, but opens him to the cal1, to the voice of 
God. ,,49 It might also attune one to the Kantian resonance within the 
intercession from the liturgy of Good Friday in which the church prays 
that "those who do not believe in God ... may find him by sincerely 
following al1 that is right. ,,50 
This interpretive convergence suggests a point for further investigation. 
Although there seem to be a number of matters on which a transcendental 
Thomist reading of Kant chronologically anticipates some of the shifts that 
, 
48 For an initial sketch of how Kant's anthropology might serve as resource for a 
Catholic theology of grace in the context of postmodern discourse and culture, see 
Philip J. Rossi, S.J. , "Finite Freedom, Fractured and Fragile: Kant's Anthropology 
as Resource for a Post-modern Theology of Grace," Philosophie et Theologie: 
Festschrift Emilio Brito, ed. Eric Gaziaux (Leuven: Peeters, 2007) 47- 60. 
49 Veritatis splendor no. 58. The passage, which quotes an address John Paul II 
originally delivered in 1983, ten years before the publication of Veritatis splendor, 
continues: "Moral conscience does not close man within an insurmountable and 
impenetrable solitude, but opens him to the call , to the voice of God. In this, and 
not in anything else, lies the entire mystery and the dignity of the moral conscience: 
in being the place, the sacred place where God speaks to man" (see John Paul II , 
address to a general audience, August 17, 1983, http://www.vatican.va/holy_father/ 
john_pauUi/audiences/1983/documents/hfjp-ii_aud_19830817 _it.html [accessed 
September 23, 2009]) ; see also Fides et ratio no. 25 where John Paul affirms "the 
search for truth which looks to the good which is to be performed." 
50 The Roman Missal: Sacramentary, English translation prepared by the Inter-
national Commission on English in the Liturgy (revised according to the second 
typical edition of the Missale Romanum [1975], Good Friday: Celebration of the 
Lord's Passion, Intercessory Prayers VIII: "For those who do not believe in God." 
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seem to be taking place in Anglo-American interpretation of Kant's 
anthropology and its role in his account of human reason, it is highly 
unlikely that the latter was influenced by the former. If, however, it turns 
out that this more recent philosophical reading of Kant does more ade-
quately represent "what Kant, in fact , held," one might ask whether the 
transcendental Thomists' anticipation of this reading might have been a 
consequence of the theological orientation that had a role in their "inter-
rogation" of Kant. Might their reading of Kant have been an instance in 
which a theological frame of reference offered a vantage point better 
positioned to note some matters of philosophical import? I believe that a 
similar question can be posed to the interpretations of Kant provided by 
Karl Barth and H. Richard Niebuhr, two of the great Protestant theolo-
gians of the 20th century, who on certain key points seem to have suc-
ceeded better than many of their philosophical contemporaries in getting 
Kant "right. " 
Yet, just as a more theologically receptive reading of Kant has started to 
gain more prominence in philosophical discussions, Catholic theology 
seems to be reassessing-and, in some quarters, moving away from-tran-
scendental Thomism and other "critical correlationist theologies" that, in 
various ways, sought to retrieve key aspects of the methods and forms of 
modern intellectual inquiry and put them to positive theological use. As 
Anthony Godzieba has noted, theological approaches such as "Hans Urs 
von Balthasar's work ... , the Radical Orthodoxy industry, and the philo-
sophical theology developed under the influence of Jacques Derrida, most 
notably the work of Jean-Luc Marion and John Caputo's 'religion without 
religion'" have become "major rivals" to the style of Catholic theology 
typical of the decades immediately following Vatican II.s1 Godzieba 
observes that all three of these approaches are "critical or even disdainful 
of any kind of correlation between the 'modern world' and Catholicism" 
and that "the obvious thread that ties these diverse styles together is their 
systematic and fundamentally negative evaluation of modernity."s2 Not 
surprisingly, as a key figure of modernity, Kant is included in that negative 
evaluation and often reinstated in the role of (arch)adversarius. 
Does this apparent shift in the Catholic theological horizon, then, signal 
the end of "friendly" Catholic interrogation of Kant? I hope not, but there 
surely are some who welcome a return to strongly adversarial styles of 
dealing with Kant-as well as with the host of other thinkers who have 
shaped "modernity." The sharp-edged polemic against modernity used by 
51 Anthony Godzieba, "Incarnation, Theory, and Catholic Bodies: What Should 
Post-postmodern Catholic Theology Look Like? " Louvain Studies 28 (2003) 
217-3l. 
52 Ibid. 220. 
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the proponents of Radical Orthodoxy is witness to this. In contrast, a 
document such as John Paul II 's encyclical Fides et ratio exhibits a more 
complex stance with respect to its view of theological engagement with the 
various strands of modern and contemporary philosophy. Its endorsement 
of a modest philosophical pluralism stands side by side with the more 
formal cataloging of the pernicious "isms" of modernity reminiscent of an 
earlier style of neo-scholasticism. 53 This is itself one index of the fact that, 
for more than two centuries, there has been more than one Catholic style 
for interrogation of modern philosophy and a hesitant recognition that the 
tensive interplay among these styles has long marked official and unofficial 
Catholic responses to modernity and its aftermath. While these various 
styles all have their particular value, I do think there is one that offers a 
particularly wide range of possibilities for yielding results of value for both 
philosophical and theological inquiry. I see this style at work in authors 
such as Charles Taylor and Louis Dupre for whom the "catholicity" of 
their interrogation functions in terms of a confidence in the universal 
abundance of God's grace; it is a style that is generously open to the 
possibility that, even in the darkest, most unpromising, and most resistant 
regions of the mind, heart and spirit of modernity-and postmodernity-
the Spirit of God is ceaselessly at work. 
S3 For the endorsement of a limited philosophical pluralism, see Fides et ratio 
nos. 74- 76; for the cataloging of various "isms" see nos. 46, 54-55, 86-90. 
